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OUR VERY PRIVILEGED EXECUTIVE:  
WHY THE JUDICIARY CAN (AND SHOULD) FIX THE 
STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗ 
In United States v. Reynolds, the Supreme Court shaped the state secrets 
privilege (the “Privilege”) as one akin to that against self-incrimination. In recent 
litigation, the government has asserted the Privilege in motions for prediscovery 
dismissal, thus transforming the Privilege into a form of executive immunity. This 
Article argues that courts must step in to return the Privilege to a scope more in 
keeping with its status as a form of evidentiary privilege. 
After reviewing the doctrinal origin of the Privilege, this Article explores three 
types of issues implicated by the government’s invocation of the Privilege. The 
government, in calling for judicial deference to executive assertions of the 
Privilege, often relies on (1) separation of powers arguments or on (2) arguments 
sounding in institutional competence. Courts are often swayed by such arguments 
and thus give relatively little consideration to the (3) conflict of interest inherent in 
the government’s assertion of the Privilege and the impact of the successful 
invocation of the Privilege on the rights of individual litigants. 
This Article then proceeds to address arguments that Congress can provide a 
check on executive abuse of the Privilege. The Article argues that, assuming that 
Congress has constitutional authority, it lacks the will or the institutional 
competence to provide a proper solution to the problems raised by the Privilege. 
Instead, the Article contends that since courts created the Privilege, courts are best 
positioned to rein it in. The final section of the Article provides examples drawn 
from case law illustrating mechanisms whereby courts can protect state secrets 
while also giving litigants adverse to the government their day in court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Reynolds,1 the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time 
recognized—and established the contours of—what has since been known as the 
“state secrets privilege” (the “Privilege”).2 As Reynolds established, the Privilege 
applies when there is a “reasonable danger” that production of evidence in 
litigation would result in the disclosure of secret information relevant to national 
security.3 In such cases, the party from whom production is sought is not 
obligated to produce evidence or information protected by the Privilege.4 
The current litigation trend is for courts to dismiss cases before discovery 
based on the successful invocation of the Privilege.5 Such an extreme remedy is 
uncalled for in almost all state secrets cases and simply cannot be reconciled with 
the Reynolds Court’s understanding of the Privilege as being akin to that against 
self-incrimination.6 In dismissing cases based on the successful invocation of the 
Privilege, courts have transformed the Privilege into a new and extraordinarily 
expansive doctrine of executive immunity7—which the government can also 
invoke to immunize nonstate actors that stand accused of violations of the 
 
1. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
2. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-8.  
3. Id. at 10. 
4. Id. at 10-11. 
5. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 310-11 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 06-
1613, 2007 WL 1646914 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2007) (affirming prediscovery dismissal on state secrets grounds 
of suit brought by German national who alleged that U.S. agents and others had subjected him to 
torture, unlawful detention, and inhumane treatment); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 348-49 (4th Cir. 
2005) (affirming prediscovery dismissal on state secrets grounds of suit aga inst Central Intelligence 
Agency for race discrimination under Title VII); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 917 
(N.D. Ill. 2006) (dismissing before discovery challenge to National Security Agency’s warrantless 
wiretapping program on state secrets grounds); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 
81-82 (D.D.C. 2004) (dismissing before discovery wrongful termination suit against Federal Bureau of 
Investigation on state secrets grounds), aff’d without opinion, 161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
6. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8 (calling privilege against self-incrimination analogous to state 
secrets privilege). 
7. See Henry Lanman, Secret Guarding, SLATE, May 22, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2142155/ 
(criticizing Bush administration for transforming Privilege into “doctrine of broad government 
immunity”).  
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statutory and constitutional rights of U.S. citizens or of the human rights of 
foreign nationals, purportedly in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy aims.8 
While Congress likely has the constitutional authority to regulate the 
Privilege,9 it is unlikely to do so. On the other hand, although the courts have 
made a mess of the Privilege post-Reynolds, nothing forecloses the possibility of 
judicial remedies to problems posed by the Privilege. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the mysterious origin of 
the Privilege. Part II reviews three types of interests implicated in the executive’s 
invocation of the Privilege: (a) executive power and separation of powers 
concerns, (b) institutional competence concerns, and (c) individual rights and the 
self-interested nature of the Privilege. Part III responds to Professor Neil 
Kinkopf’s suggestion that Congress, rather than the judiciary, is the appropriate 
branch to check claims of executive privilege, either through legislation or 
through expanded oversight. Finally, Part IV proposes a menu of alternative 
remedies that courts might impose, short of dismissal, after the successful 
invocation of the Privilege. 
The aim here is not to advocate that the Privilege be abolished. Rather, 
because there is an ever-present danger that the government will invoke the 
Privilege in a self-interested manner in order to protect not state secrets but the 
government itself from embarrassment, it makes sense that, at least some of the 
time, the government, rather than innocent third parties, ought to bear the 
litigation costs of the successful invocation of the Privilege.10 Bearing the cost 
may mean that the government cannot assert defenses based on privileged 
information or it may mean that the government must bear the actual monetary 
costs of facilitating the continuation of the litigation in a manner that protects 
state secrets. This Article contends that it is up to courts, not Congress, to force 
the government to bear some of these costs and that the best point of departure 
for doing so is a return to the Reynolds Court’s conception of the Privilege as 
analogous to the privilege against self-incrimination. Moreover, although 
Reynolds certainly left plenty of room for lower courts to experiment with 
creative solutions to the problems posed by litigation that might force the 
disclosure of state secrets, Reynolds itself is problematic enough to justify the 
Supreme Court’s reconsideration of the approach to the Privilege established in 
that case. 
 
8. See, e.g., El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 300 (dismissing suit brought by German national against U.S. 
agents and third-party contractors allegedly complicit in his abduction and extraordinary rendition to 
Afghani prison); Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (dismissing lawsuit alleging statutory and constitutional 
violations against telephone service provider in connection with National Security Agency surveillance 
programs).  
9. Neil Kinkopf, The State Secrets Problem: Can Congress Fix It?, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 498 
(2007). 
10. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of how assertion of the Privilege 
affects litigants.  
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I. A NEW LEGAL LOHENGRIN:11 THE ORIGIN OF THE PRIVILEGE 
The origin of the Privilege is significant because the powers of Congress or 
the courts to regulate the Privilege depend on its origin. If the Privilege is simply 
a common law doctrine created by the courts, there would be no question that, 
absent statutory instructions to the contrary, courts can shape the Privilege as 
they see fit. If, on the other hand, it really does derive from some invisible 
radiation of Article II of the Constitution, the argument that Congress or the 
courts have power to rein it in becomes much harder to make.12 And 
congressional or judicial power over state secrets could be very narrow indeed if 
the Privilege arises in a context in which the executive may be said to “personify 
the federal sovereignty.”13 
As political scientists William Weaver and Robert Pallitto, authors of a 
widely cited essay on the Privilege,14 have argued, there are basically two lines of 
provenance for the Privilege.15 While the first line seems to be constitutional in 
nature and derived from the history of the first Presidents, that line actually is 
broader than the Privilege, encompassing the more expansive doctrine of 
executive privilege.16 The second line is the common law of the United Kingdom, 
adopted and slightly modified in the 1953 case United States v. Reynolds,17 in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time recognized the Privilege.18 
It may well be that the Reynolds Court would have trespassed into the 
 
11. Speaking of the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2006), the Second Circuit 
stated: “This old but little used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since 
the first Judiciary Act, no one seems to know whence it came.” IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 
1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (citation omitted); see also Lucien J. Dhooge, Lohengrin Revealed: The 
Implications of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain for Human Rights Litigation Pursuant to the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 393, 393 n.1 (2006) (noting German legend in which 
Lohengrin miraculously appears to rescue maiden but mysteriously vanishes upon being asked from 
whence he came). 
12. In his Keynote Address at the Symposium, Marty Lederman noted that even when there is a 
conflict between the executive and the Congress in matters of foreign affairs, the executive’s power is 
at its “lowest ebb,” but it is not completely eliminated. Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law 
at Georgetown Univ., Keynote Address at the Temple Law Review Symposium: Executive Power: 
Exploring the Limits of Article II (Mar. 23, 2007). 
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
14. William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 
85, 93 (2005). 
15. Id. at 93-99. 
16. Id. at 93. 
17. 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953); see also Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National 
Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1271-83 (2007) (reviewing “public interest” 
privileges in nineteenth and twentieth century Anglo-American common law prior to Reynolds). But 
see LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND 
THE REYNOLDS CASE 71 (2006) (arguing that British precedent is not controlling as “Congress and 
federal courts have much greater independence than their counterparts in England”); Weaver & 
Pallitto, supra note 14, at 99 (criticizing Reynolds’s reliance on English cases as “improvident”). 
18. See FISHER, supra note 17, at xi (characterizing Reynolds case as having “formalized the state 
secrets privilege”); Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1931, 1936 (2007) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the Privilege in Reynolds). 
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realm of executive power over foreign affairs and national security if it had held 
that the executive can never rely on the Privilege to avoid its discovery 
obligations. Since courts have created the Privilege, however, it is hard to see 
how the Constitution would prevent them from shaping that Privilege as they see 
fit in order to protect the state interest in preserving its secrets while also 
protecting the rights of individual litigants.19 
In Reynolds, the survivors of civilians who were killed when a military 
aircraft crashed sued the government for negligence in connection with the 
crash.20 The government disclosed that the aircraft was testing new electronic 
equipment.21 The plaintiffs sought the Air Force’s official accident investigation 
report pursuant to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.22 
The U.S. Supreme Court treated the Privilege as properly invoked23 and 
noted that the government, while trying to avoid disclosure of the Air Force 
investigation report, had offered to make three surviving witnesses available to 
plaintiffs.24 The Reynolds Court held that the plaintiffs should have taken the 
government up on its offer.25 Because these witnesses were available, and 
because there was a “reasonable danger” that disclosure of the report would 
entail the disclosure of secret information relevant to national security, the Court 
ruled that the government should not be forced to produce the report.26 
One of the most peculiar things about the Privilege is that the Reynolds 
Court was the first to misapply the Reynolds procedure for determining whether 
the Privilege applies.27 Reynolds held that the invocation of the Privilege is 
appropriate when it is “possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of 
the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will 
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be 
 
19. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10 (noting that “[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot 
be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers” but also cautioning that “the court should not 
jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect”).  
20. Id. at 3. 
21. FISHER, supra note 17, at 1-2 (stating that public relations officer at plane’s air base told 
reporters that bomber that crashed had been on mission to test secret electronic equipment). 
22. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3. 
23. See id. at 7-8 (setting forth requirements for invocation of Privilege and finding procedural 
steps to be met). Louis Fisher sets out the full history of the Reynolds case, making clear that the 
Privilege was not properly invoked at the trial or appellate level. FISHER, supra note 17, at 29-91. 
Rather, at the district court level, the government withheld the Air Force’s official accident 
investigation report based on the Housekeeping Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1789) (current version at 5 
U.S.C. § 301 (2000)), and various hearsay objections. Id. at 36. Before the Third Circuit, the 
government relied on the Housekeeping Statute and on “executive immunity.” Id. at 64-69.  
24. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5. 
25. Id. at 11. 
26. Id. at 10. 
27. See FISHER, supra note 17, at 112 (quoting Justice Vinson’s admonition that judicial control 
over evidence “cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers” but then pointing out that 
judge would never know if executive officer acted capriciously under procedure adopted in Reynolds 
(quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10)); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 101 (contending that 
“practical effect” of Reynolds has been to foster very abdication of control over evidence against 
which Reynolds Court warned). 
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divulged.”28 The Court then concluded, without reviewing the report, that there 
certainly was “a reasonable danger that the accident investigation report would 
contain references” to secret information.29 Because witnesses were available 
who could provide information similar to that contained in the report, the Court 
decided that it did not need to review the report to see whether that “reasonable 
danger” was realized.30 The accident report, which has now been declassified, 
contained no secret information31 and would have supported plaintiffs’ 
negligence claim32 had they been permitted access to it. 
Some commentary on Reynolds suggests that the case does a good job of 
articulating a workable solution to the problem courts confront in state secrets 
cases while bungling the application of the doctrine to the facts at hand.33 But 
the test articulated in Reynolds may also be fundamentally incoherent. On the 
one hand, the Court stated that where a plaintiff can make “a strong showing of 
necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted.”34 On the other 
hand, in a footnote, the Court acknowledged Totten v. United States,35 a case 
brought by the survivors of a purported Civil War spy, in which the Court held 
that a person may not sue the government to enforce a secret agreement to 
engage in espionage.36 In so doing, the Court embraced Totten’s ruling that 
“where the very subject matter of the action . . . was a matter of state secret,” the 
action must be dismissed on the pleadings.37 Plaintiffs are thus presented with a 
Hobson’s choice. If they downplay the importance of the information sought, 
courts are likely to accept the invocation of the Privilege without in camera 
inspection.38 If they stress the importance of the evidence in an attempt to get 
courts to “probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is 
appropriate,”39 courts are more likely to determine, as they now routinely do, 
that the information sought constitutes the very subject matter of the litigation 
 
28. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. See FISHER, supra note 17, at 166-67 (reporting that daughter of one of civilians killed in 
plane crash at issue in Reynolds ordered accident report from website in 2000 and “was disappointed 
that it made no mention of the secret project”). 
32. According to the plaintiffs, “[t]he declassified documents . . . identify the main cause of the 
accident as the Air Force’s failure to comply with two technical orders that mandated changes to the 
exhaust manifold assemblies to eliminate a fire hazard.” Id. at 178.  
33. Chesney, supra note 17, at 1288 (proposing “clear and convincing” standard in place of 
Reynolds’s “reasonable danger” test but otherwise endorsing Reynolds’s approach and arguing that 
Court’s failure to notice that investigation report contained no state secrets illustrates “folly” of 
reasonable danger standard).  
34. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11. 
35. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).  
36. Totten, 92 U.S. at 107. 
37. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 & n.26 (citing Totten, 92 U.S. 105). 
38. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 101 (calculating that courts required in camera 
inspection in less than one-third of reported cases in which Privilege has been invoked).  
39. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11. 
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and dismiss the case.40 
Reynolds thus has a sort of dual legacy. On the one hand, it establishes the 
Privilege and the procedures that are intended to protect both the government 
and litigants in cases in which the Privilege is invoked. That portion of its legacy 
is largely uncontroversial. That is, litigants seem to recognize the need for the 
Privilege and understand that the Privilege, if properly invoked, is and ought to 
be absolute. On the other hand, Reynolds is emblematic of the government’s bad 
faith in invoking the Privilege—and also emblematic of courts’ refusal to 
challenge executive claims of secrecy. 
II. INTERESTS IMPLICATED IN THE INVOCATION OF THE PRIVILEGE 
Three types of arguments ought to be considered in evaluating the 
Privilege. The strong case in favor of the Privilege is both constitutional and 
prudential, relying first on theories of executive power and the separation of 
powers and second on arguments relating to institutional competence. As Neil 
Kinkopf points out, in its strongest form, relying on a version of unitary 
executive theory, such an argument could prevent any check on executive claims 
of privilege.41 I agree with Neil Kinkopf that such an expansive theory of the 
unitary executive distorts the doctrine of separation of powers and threatens the 
principle of checks and balances that is also central to our form of government. 
Moreover, the Privilege implicates a third set of concerns about which courts 
have had far too little to say. Courts have been inexplicably obtuse in ignoring 
the conflict of interest inherent in the government’s invocation of the Privilege 
and inexcusably callous in dismissing the rights of individual litigants who cannot 
vindicate their rights due to the Privilege. 
A. The Executive Power and Separation of Powers Argument for an Expansive 
Privilege 
In United States v. Reynolds,42 both plaintiffs and the government claimed 
that the Constitution mandated a ruling in their favor.43 The Court found it 
unnecessary to address the government’s constitutional claim that “executive 
department heads have power to withhold any documents in their custody from 
judicial view if they deem it to be in the public interest,” as it was able to decide 
 
40. See, e.g., Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 346 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court finding 
that information sought formed “the very basis of the factual disputes in this case” and concluding that 
there was “no way for Sterling to prove employment discrimination without exposing at least some 
classified details of the covert employment that gives context to his claim”); Black v. United States, 62 
F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding information subject to Privilege to be “at the core of Black’s 
claims” and concluding that litigation could not be tailored so as to proceed without information 
subject to Privilege); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (concluding that 
Privilege precluded defendant from affirming or denying activities alleged in complaint). 
41. Kinkopf, supra note 9, at 494-96. 
42. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
43. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6. 
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the case on narrower grounds.44 In its recent memoranda in support of various 
motions invoking the Privilege, the U.S. government has again argued that the 
Privilege is constitutional in origin.45 
The conclusion that the Privilege is constitutional in origin would be a 
surprising result, since, as I have already noted, the Privilege was not officially 
recognized until 1953.46 The stronger view seems to be that the origin of the 
Privilege lies in the common law but that the common law rules have been 
developed to protect some essential constitutional core.47 But the nature of that 
constitutional core remains obscure. The Reynolds Court rather evasively 
suggested in a footnote that the Privilege is rooted in the separation of powers.48 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon49 was somewhat more direct, 
stating that, “[t]he privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and 
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”50 Still, 
the precise derivation of the Privilege from Article II is never spelled out. 
Even if the Privilege implicates the executive branch’s constitutional 
powers, the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that it retains an oversight 
role, even in the area of foreign affairs51 and specifically in the realm of state 
secrets.52 The Constitution does not articulate an absolute separation of 
powers.53 If the separation of powers argument is asserted too energetically, it 
 
44. Id. 
45. Chesney, supra note 17, at 1261; see also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of the Motion by Intervenor United States to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 
4, El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No. 1:05-cv-01417-TSE-TRJ), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/govt_mot_dismiss.pdf (calling Privilege “without peer among 
governmental privileges” and “a manifestation of the President’s Article I [sic] powers”). 
46. See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that scope of Privilege had 
remained “somewhat in doubt” before World War II as government had rarely invoked it).  
47. Chesney, supra note 17, at 1310 (describing Privilege as “having a potentially inalterable 
constitutional core surrounded by a revisable common-law shell”); id. at 1271 (noting that, beginning 
in 1970s, opinions discussing Privilege invoked theme of separation of powers, “suggesting a 
constitutional foundation to reinforce the common law origins of the doctrine”); Frost, supra note 18, 
at 1935 (calling Privilege common law evidentiary privilege deriving from President’s national security 
authority and thus infused with “constitutional overtones” (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6)). 
48. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6 n.9. 
49. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
50. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708; see also Halkin v. Helms (Halkin I), 598 F.2d 1, 14 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(Bazelon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that constitutional basis for 
Privilege is unclear and noting that Nixon Court “appears to have derived the privilege from the 
President’s Article II duties as Commander in Chief and his responsibility for the conduct of foreign 
affairs”).  
51. Most recently, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Court stated: “Whatever 
power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations 
or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three 
branches when individual liberties are at stake.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.  
52. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706 (refusing to accept arguments that doctrine of separation of 
powers or need for confidentiality in executive communications justify broad doctrine of executive 
immunity from judicial oversight). 
53. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 18 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (arguing that 
unless branches of federal government “be so far connected and blended as to give each a 
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gives rise to concerns relating to our constitutional system of checks and 
balances. As the Supreme Court stated in Nixon: 
The President’s counsel . . . reads the Constitution as providing an 
absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential 
communications. Many decisions of this Court, however, have 
unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 
137 (1803), that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”54 
To the extent that government arguments about the Privilege raise checks and 
balances concerns, some combination of judicial and legislative oversight of the 
Privilege is mandated.55 
Courts and Congress must not go too far in restricting the executive branch 
from pursuing the foreign affairs strategies it believes necessary for national 
security, but those branches also must maintain sufficient power to check the 
executive and protect individual rights.56 To the extent that the Privilege 
implicates either separation of powers concerns or Article II powers, judicial 
deference to executive determinations in the area is appropriate.57 But when 
state secrets arise in the context of litigation, we are not in an area of exclusive 
executive power, and therefore the courts and Congress may serve as a 
constitutional check on the abuse of the Privilege, so long as they do so in ways 
that are consistent with the exercise of executive foreign affairs powers.58 
B. The Institutional Competence Argument for an Expansive Privilege 
A second justification of the Privilege is not constitutional but prudential. 
As Weaver and Pallitto have put it, “[a]lthough judges occasionally ground the 
privilege in separation of powers, the ultimate reason for upholding its use is on 
 
constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential 
to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained”).  
54. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
55. See Frost, supra note 18, at 1933 (arguing that, in seeking dismissal of state secrets cases, 
executive strips Congress “of its ability to collaborate with the judiciary to curb executive power”); id. 
at 1955 (criticizing executive arguments suggesting that state secrets decisions be left to “political 
branches” for overlooking role of Congress, “one of the political branches,” in granting courts 
jurisdiction to determine legality of executive conduct).  
56. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 604 (1988) (remarking on district courts’ ability to control 
discovery process to balance one party’s need for access to proof in support of colorable claims against 
government’s need to protect confidentiality); FISHER, supra note 17, at 258 (rejecting broad judicial 
deference to executive branch as undermining “the judiciary’s duty to assure fairness in the courtroom 
and to decide what evidence may be introduced”); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 90 (contending 
that Privilege prevents courts from exercising their constitutional duty to oversee executive). 
57. See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that trial judges “should 
accord considerable deference to recommendations from the executive department”); Halkin v. Helms 
(Halkin I), 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (urging courts to accord “utmost deference” to executive 
assertions of Privilege (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710)).  
58. In insightful comments at the Symposium, Marty Lederman said that he was not sure that 
Congress has constitutional authority to limit the scope of the Privilege. Nevertheless, he claimed that 
Congress had in fact done so without eliciting strong objections from the executive branch. Lederman, 
supra note 12.  
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the practical grounds that it is necessary to the survival of the state.”59 In order 
to protect national security, certain matters must not be disclosed through 
litigation, and the executive is far better positioned than are the courts to 
determine when litigation implicates national security secrets.60 
The executive has unique competence to identify state secrets and to 
recognize dangers that might arise from the disclosure of such secrets.61 Various 
agencies within the executive branch engage, on a daily basis, in activities 
relating to national security where the maintenance of state secrets is a high 
priority.62 As the Supreme Court has recognized, however, while the executive 
might have superior competence in intelligence and national security matters, it 
is not as if the judiciary is completely unequipped to address matters that touch 
on secrecy: 
 We cannot accept the Government’s argument that internal security 
matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. Courts 
regularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society. There is no 
reason to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or 
uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases.63 
Moreover, courts can accord the executive the “utmost deference”64 when it 
comes to executive contentions that documents sought in discovery contain state 
secrets whose disclosure would constitute a reasonable danger65 to national 
security and still be free to fashion an appropriate remedy that will preserve 
litigants’ rights.66 
 
59. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 92; see also Claudio Ochoa, Federalism and Separation of 
Powers: The State Secrets Privilege: Necessary Evil? ENGAGE, Feb. 2007, at 66, 67 (observing that 
courts are reluctant to challenge executive assertions of Privilege out of deference to executive 
expertise in area of national security).  
60. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 11, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(No. 06-1667), 2006 WL 2726281 (describing decision to invoke Privilege as “policy judgment” and 
remarking that Privilege is based on prediction of effect of disclosure on foreign states or nonstate 
actors). 
61. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 583 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contending that 
courts lack information and expertise to challenge presidential decisions relating to national security 
and foreign affairs); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 536 (E.D. Va. 2006) (admonishing courts 
to “bear in mind” executive branch’s authority over military and diplomatic affairs and its expertise in 
predicting effect of disclosure on national security). 
62. See, e.g., Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1974) (observing that executive 
“resources and expertise in foreign affairs far outstrip those of the judiciary”); United States v. 
Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972) (noting that Central Intelligence Agency is executive 
agency regularly engaged in conduct of foreign affairs and national defense and that its clarification 
processes are beyond judicial review).  
63. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972); see also Hepting v. AT&T 
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (recognizing and respecting executive’s duty “to 
protect the nation from threats” but refusing to abdicate court’s duty to adjudicate disputes in face of 
blanket assertions of secrecy). 
64. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
65. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). 
66. See infra Part IV for a discussion of judicial alternatives for proceeding with cases despite 
successful claims of privilege. 
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Bobby Chesney, Wake Forest law professor and national security expert, 
has suggested one way around the institutional competence issue that judges face 
by advocating the creation of a specialized court—along the lines of Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act67 Court68 (“FISC”)—to adjudicate state secrets 
claims.69 The FISC is a secret federal court established by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) that reviews applications for surveillance 
warrants from federal agencies. Chesney proposes that Congress could create a 
classified judicial forum in which Article III judges could hear matters in camera 
and then have the proceedings permanently sealed.70 The problem with the 
FISA model that Chesney proposes is that the FISC has not historically 
constituted much of a check on executive authority. It first began reviewing 
applications in 1979 and did not refuse a request for a warrant until 2003.71 
There are good reasons why the FISC invariably grants the government the 
warrants it seeks—the judges on the FISC likely believe that they owe the 
executive a great deal of deference in matters of national security. The political 
branches have spoken, through the FISA statute, and made clear their desire 
that the executive be empowered to engage in foreign intelligence surveillance, 
albeit with a check on executive authority so as to protect individual rights.72 
FISC judges also likely believe that they ought to defer to the institutional 
competence of the executive agencies that seek such warrants. But this suggests 
that a FISC-like state secrets privilege court would not really address the 
 
67. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2000), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000), 47 U.S.C. §§ 605-606 (2000), and in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), amended by Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. 
L. No. 106-120, 113 Stat. 1606 (1999).  
68. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (providing that Chief Justice of United States shall designate eleven 
federal judges “who shall constitute a court which shall have jurisdiction to hear applications for and 
grant orders approving electronic surveillance” in accordance with Act).  
69. Chesney, supra note 17, at 1313. 
70. Id. 
71. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders, 1979-
2006, http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2007). In its first 
twenty-five years of existence, the FISC approved over 20,000 applications. Id. After holding steady in 
the 475-635 range from 1982 to 1993, the number of such applications doubled between 1993 and 2000 
and doubled again between 2000 and 2005. Id. In 2005, the FISC approved more surveillance warrants 
than were issued by all other federal and state courts combined. Jameel Jaffer, Panel Report: Secret 
Evidence in the Investigative Stage: FISA, Administrative Subpoenas, and Privacy, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L., 
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 7, 7 (2006). 
72. The Senate Judiciary Committee that drafted the FISA expressed the need to establish 
checks on executive authority even in the area of national security: 
[T]he Executive Branch of Government should have, under proper circumstances and with 
appropriate safeguards, authority to acquire important foreign intelligence information by 
means of electronic surveillance. The committee also believes that the past record and the 
state of the law in the area make it desirable that the Executive Branch not be the sole or 
final arbiter of when such proper circumstances exist. [FISA] is designed to permit the 
Government to gather necessary foreign intelligence information by means of electronic 
surveillance but under limitations and according to procedural guidelines which will better 
safeguard the rights of individuals. 
S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 9 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3910.  
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institutional competence concerns addressed above. In addition, as the 
deliberations of a state secrets privilege court modeled on the FISC would be 
secret, a FISA model does little to address concerns about open government.73 
Finally, the FISA model does nothing to address the self-interested nature of the 
Privilege, a topic explored in the next subpart. That subpart also provides my 
own suggestion for an institutional check on the Privilege, which I think more 
satisfactorily addresses all of the interests implicated by the Privilege.74 
C. The Self-Interested Invocation of the Privilege and Individual Rights 
The Privilege also implicates a third series of concerns relating to conflicts 
of interest and the protection of individual rights. In Reynolds, the Supreme 
Court specified that the Privilege is properly invoked by the head of the 
executive department controlling the evidence subject to the Privilege.75 So, if 
like Khaled El-Masri, you are suing the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (“CIA”), you can expect to see an affidavit from the Director of the CIA 
stating that all information relating to your claim and in possession of the United 
States is classified and could not be disclosed without a reasonable danger of 
harming national security.76 In fact, under the mosaic theory77 and related 
 
73. See 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 2375, at 3341 (1905) (stating that requiring officials “to justify their acts is the chief 
safeguard against oppression and corruption”); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 89-90 (observing 
that openness in government and checks and balances are hallmarks of liberal-democratic political 
tradition). In a letter criticizing a revised draft of proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509 on the 
Privilege, the Department of Justice acknowledged “that a basic principle of our democratic form of 
government is that most information in control of the Executive Branch should be readily and fully 
available to the public generally and to individual litigants.” Letter from Richard Kleindienst, 
Attorney Gen., to Judge Maris, Chairman of the Comm. on Practice and Procedure of the Judicial 
Conference (Aug. 9, 1971), 117 CONG. REC. 33,651 (1971), reprinted in 26 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5661, at 430 n.45 (1992).  
74. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of a model adopted from 
Delaware corporations law as a solution.  
75. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S 1, 7-8 (1953). 
76. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 06-1613, 
2007 WL 1646914 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2007) (describing two sworn declarations submitted by then-Director 
of CIA explaining United States’ reasons for asserting Privilege). 
77. The locus classicus for mosaic theory seems to be United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 
(4th Cir. 1972), in which the Fourth Circuit stated: 
The significance of one item of information may frequently depend upon knowledge of 
many other items of information. What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of 
great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of 
information in its proper context. The courts, of course, are ill-equipped to become 
sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence matters to serve effectively in the review of 
secrecy classifications in that area.  
Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1318. The D.C. Circuit expanded on the topic in Halkin I: 
 It requires little reflection to understand that the business of foreign intelligence 
gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin to the construction of a mosaic 
than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger affair. Thousands of bits and pieces of 
seemingly innocuous information can be analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with 
startling clarity how the unseen whole must operate. 
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doctrines,78 the Privilege can be invoked even if a small portion of the 
information to which the Privilege applies is classified.79 
As of 2001, the Privilege was invoked in over fifty cases, and in only four of 
those cases did the courts reject the assertion of the Privilege.80 That means that 
the government can invoke the Privilege with considerable confidence that it will 
thereby squelch plaintiffs’ attempts at discovery. Moreover, the invocation of the 
Privilege would appear to be relatively costless,81 as there are no reported cases 
in which the government is sanctioned for improper invocations of the Privilege. 
As Weaver and Pallitto note, “[i]t is hardly surprising that such an effective tool 
would tempt presidents to use it with increasing frequency and in a variety of 
circumstances.”82 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized this 
danger, warning that “the privilege against disclosure might gradually be 
enlarged by executive determinations until . . . it embraced the whole range of 
governmental activities.”83 
Moreover, because the Privilege is absolute, courts are unmoved by the 
hardship its invocation imposes on individual litigants.84 Indeed, courts may even 
withhold from plaintiffs the grounds for the dismissal of their suit.85 In Edmonds 
v. U.S. Department of Justice,86 Judge Walton, to his credit, engaged in some soul 
searching in dismissing plaintiff’s claims “with great consternation.”87 Before 
doing so, he stressed that he was “[m]indful of the need for virtual unfettered 
 
Halkin v. Helms (Halkin I), 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  
78. For example, in affirming the district court’s dismissal of claims under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971), the Eighth Circuit combined an institutional competence theory with the mosaic theory and 
concluded that the court must accord executive agencies the “utmost deference” because courts are 
“uninitiated” when it comes to determining whether particular disclosures would compromise national 
security. Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1119 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Zuckerbraun v. Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991)). The Fourth Circuit dismissed a case on state secrets 
grounds where it was concerned that the contours of state secrets would be revealed if the government 
were to allow an expert witness to answer some questions but object to others. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse 
Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 1985).  
79. Weaver and Pallitto describe the mosaic theory as holding that “even unclassified, seemingly 
banal information may be protected by the privilege because the sum of a large number of unclassified 
disclosures may add up to an overall picture of classified operations and capabilities.” Weaver & 
Pallitto, supra note 14, at 104.  
80. Id. at 101-02. 
81. See id. at 86 (concluding that only possible cost to government of excessive assertions of 
Privilege is “bad publicity”).  
82. Id. at 102. 
83. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 995 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
84. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (pronouncing that necessity cannot 
overcome Privilege when military secrets are at stake); In re Under Seal, 945 F.2d 1285, 1289 (4th Cir. 
1991) (expressing “discomfort” in depriving litigant of judicial forum but “not so reluctantly” 
concluding that district court’s grant of summary judgment was correct).  
85. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 312 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 06-1613, 
2007 WL 1646914 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2007) (noting that it must be frustrating to plaintiff that reasons for 
dismissal of his suit are classified). 
86. 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004). 
87. Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 81-82.  
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access to the judicial process in a governmental system integrally linked to the 
rule of law.”88 In Sterling v. Tenet,89 the Fourth Circuit was forthright in 
recognizing “that our decision places, on behalf of the entire country, a burden 
on Sterling that he alone must bear.”90 While the court may be correct that “a 
nation without sound intelligence is a nation at risk,”91 it does not follow that the 
government should not bear at least some of the costs necessary for the 
protection of state secrets in the litigation context. 
The Reynolds Court created the Privilege by analogy to the privilege against 
self-incrimination.92 While the privilege against self-incrimination is accepted as 
necessary to protect the individual against the inquisitorial power of the state,93 
there is no justification for the self-interested invocation of the state secrets 
privilege in favor of the government when it is adverse to persons who are 
seeking enforcement of statutory or constitutional rights.94 
Instead of a model based on the FISC, as Professor Chesney suggests, a 
model adapted from Delaware corporations law could provide a solution that 
would address both institutional competence and conflict-of-interest concerns. 
Pursuant to Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, when shareholders seek to 
hold corporate officers, directors, or both accountable for mismanagement, self-
dealing, fraud, or illegality, they must make a demand on the board to pursue 
litigation on behalf of the corporation against the malfeasant officers, directors, 
or both.95 Since the shareholders are basically asking the board members to sue 
themselves or their close associates, demand can be excused where making such 
demand would be futile.96 In order to reduce the volume of frivolous law suits 
filed against corporations and making allegations intended to get around the 
demand requirement, state law permits corporate boards to create special 
 
88. Id. at 81. 
89. 416 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2005). 
90. Sterling, 416 F.3d at 348.  
91. Id. 
92. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). 
93. See KENNETH S. BROUN, 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 513 (6th ed. 2006) (explaining that 
innocent suspect “may be unduly prejudiced by his own testimony for reasons unrelated to its 
accuracy”). 
94. When Justice Stewart asked if there was any “public interest . . . in preserving secrecy with 
respect to a criminal conspiracy” perpetrated by the government, President Nixon’s counsel attempted 
to evade the question but eventually answered that the public interest is “to avail the President . . . of a 
free and untrammeled source of information and advice, without the thought or fear that it may be 
reviewed at some later time.” Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974) (No. 73-1766), reprinted in 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 51 (1998). Such a sweeping executive 
privilege to prevent exposure of criminal conduct would eliminate significant constitutional and 
statutory protections against the exercise of unlimited executive power.  
95. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1215 (Del. 1996) (noting that Grimes made demand as 
required under Delaware law); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (characterizing 
demand requirement as recognizing “fundamental precept” that directors, rather than shareholders, 
manage corporations).  
96. See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1217 (noting that aim of demand requirement is to deter baseless 
suits while permitting suit where shareholder can show reasonable doubt that either majority of board 
is independent or that underlying transaction is protected by business judgment rule). 
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litigation committees (“SLCs”) comprised of independent directors (or newly 
appointed directors) who are not implicated in plaintiffs’ allegations.97 The SLC 
then undertakes an investigation into the plaintiffs’ allegations and is 
empowered to move, on behalf of the corporation, to dismiss the suit as 
detrimental to the interests of the corporation.98 These recommendations are 
then reviewed by a court.99 Crucially, under Delaware law, the review is not 
highly deferential.100 The court first looks into the independence of the SLC101 
and the thoroughness of its investigation and then applies its own judgment to 
determine whether the recommendation of the SLC against allowing the suit to 
proceed is valid.102 
Congress could similarly permit the creation of SLCs whose sole purpose is 
to review invocations of the Privilege. Such SLCs would consist of disinterested 
people with the requisite expertise and security clearances who would review 
executive claims that the production of government records or information 
would create a reasonable danger of disclosure of state secrets that would harm 
national security. The SLC could also be empowered to make recommendations 
to the court about how the case ought to proceed even if the privilege is properly 
invoked. Following the Delaware model, a court would then review such 
recommendations by conducting its own review of the independence of the SLC 
and the thoroughness of its investigation.103 If the SLC is independent and its 
investigation thorough, the court should accord considerable deference to its 
recommendation as to whether the Privilege is properly invoked, but the court 
should still exercise its own judgment as to the reasonableness of the SLC’s 
 
97. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (2001 & Supp. 2006) (permitting boards of directors to 
delegate authority to committee); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981) (noting 
that if corporate board were not empowered to recommend dismissal of suits regarded as detrimental 
to corporation, “a single stockholder . . . might control the destiny of the entire corporation”).  
98. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 786. 
99. See id. at 787 (discussing appropriate standard of review of SLC recommendation). 
100. See id. (rejecting business judgment rule standard and noting that “directors are passing 
judgment on fellow directors in the same corporation” and therefore might have some empathy for 
defendants). 
101. Independence in this context entails more than having no personal financial or familial 
interest in the outcome of the litigation. Rather, Delaware courts have required the members of SLCs 
to have no significant business or social ties to the defendants in the proposed suit. See Beam ex rel. 
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. 2004) (“[T]he SLC has 
the burden of establishing its own independence by a yardstick that must be ‘like Caesar’s wife’—
‘above reproach.’” (quoting Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985))); In re Oracle Corp. 
Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 920-21 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding that SLC consisting of members with 
ties to defendants through various Stanford University connections failed independence test); Parfi 
Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 794 A.2d 1211, 1232 (Del. Ch. 2001) (characterizing court’s 
inquiry into SLC’s independence as coming down to whether director is “incapable of making a 
decision with only the best interests of the corporation in mind”).  
102. See Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 789 (concluding that court should apply its own business 
judgment to evaluate motion). 
103. See id. at 788 (holding that court must first “inquire into the independence and good faith of 
the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions,” and imposing on corporation burden of 
establishing independence, good faith, and reasonableness of investigation). 
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recommendations regarding how the case is to proceed, as the SLC has no 
special expertise that would trump the court’s own intuitions about how to 
accommodate the Privilege while also permitting litigants to pursue the 
vindication of their rights through legal process.  
Such a solution would address concerns regarding the self-interested nature 
of the Privilege and would permit courts to defer to the executive (through 
deference to the SLC) on matters in which the executive has superior 
institutional competence, while preserving their own authority over matters 
where courts are more competent. Moreover, the fact that courts engage in 
separate review of the independence of the SLC provides a layer of protection 
against institutional capture that is lacking from the FISA model. Nevertheless, I 
do not expect such a solution to be proposed by Congress. Nor do I expect that 
any executive would tolerate such a check on its control of the Privilege, and so 
only a veto-proof majority of Congress could pass such legislation. 
III. CONGRESS CAN REGULATE OR OVERSEE THE PRIVILEGE, BUT WILL NOT 
Neil Kinkopf has focused on the need for congressional action to check 
executive abuse of the Privilege,104 and I agree with him that Congress has the 
constitutional authority to check executive use of the Privilege, so long as it does 
not do so in ways that would hamper or eliminate the President’s ability to carry 
out his duties under Article II.105 For the reasons given below, however, I doubt 
that Congress would be willing to encroach on executive power in connection 
with the Privilege through either statutory or regulatory oversight mechanisms. 
A. Statutory or Regulatory Options 
The basic problem with a statutory solution is that it is hard to imagine what 
such legislation would look like, and it is difficult to see how legislators or 
regulators could fashion a solution that would anticipate all the contexts in which 
the Privilege might be invoked. 
The last legislative attempt to do so was proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 
509.106 Although the rule was originally drafted by an Advisory Committee 
appointed by former Chief Justice Earl Warren107 and was intended as a 
codification of United States v. Reynolds108 as to state secrets,109 the draft rule 
was rewritten to incorporate the comments of the Department of Justice.110 The 
final version of the rule has been characterized as a “capitulat[ion]” by the 
 
104. Kinkopf, supra note 9, at 497-98. 
105. I wholly endorse the approach to the problem that Kinkopf lays out in id.  
106. Preliminary Draft of Proposed FED. R. EVID. 509, 46 F.R.D. 161, 272-74 (1969).  
107. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 73, § 5006, at 180. 
108. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).  
109. See Advisory Committee’s Note to Preliminary Draft of Proposed FED. R. EVID. 509, 46 
F.R.D. 161, 274-76 (1969) (noting that rule embodies protection of military and state secrets 
established by law of evidence as noted in Reynolds).  
110. See 26 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 73, § 5661, at 440-41 (detailing changes in draft rule 
incorporating suggestions from Department of Justice).  
TELMAN_FINAL 3/28/2008  12:01:15 AM 
2007] OUR VERY PRIVILEGED EXECUTIVE 515 
 
judiciary to the coordinated demands of the executive and its allies in the 
Senate.111 
Rule 509, in its final version, likely would have resulted in a broader 
privilege to the government than Reynolds envisioned. Specifically, it treated 
state secrets similarly to other “official information,”112 which was defined to 
include any “intragovernmental opinions or recommendations submitted for 
consideration in the performance of decisional or policymaking functions” the 
disclosure of which would be “contrary to the public interest.”113 So, for 
example, if former White House Counsel Harriet Miers and presidential advisor 
Karl Rove do not want to explain what role they played in the decision-making 
process that resulted in the firing of eight attorneys general,114 Rule 509 would 
have permitted them to assert an “official information” privilege to avoid 
testimony, even if subpoenaed. While Rule 509 is not clear on the level of 
deference due to such a claim of privilege, the proposed rule did not distinguish 
between the deference to be accorded the executive when it asserts the Privilege 
from that to be accorded to invocations of the “official information” privilege. 
Accordingly, courts would likely have given considerable deference to executive 
determinations regarding official information. 
Under the proposed rule, despite Congress’s attempt to specify the scope of 
the Privilege, courts would still have to work out the consequences of the 
successful invocation of the Privilege on a case-by-case basis.115 The statute 
provided options ranging from dismissal of a suit against the government to 
“finding against the government upon an issue as to which the evidence is 
relevant.”116 In short, the proposed rule would have provided absolutely no 
guidance on the crucial issue of how courts were to permit litigation to proceed 
once the Privilege is successfully invoked. 
It is striking that the proposed federal rule, which would have expanded the 
Privilege as it then existed, was drafted and revised while the Nixon White 
House was engaged in secret operations that eventually came to light as the 
 
111. Id. § 5661, at 439.  
112. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 509(a)(2), reprinted in 26 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 73, at 
415-16.  
113. Id. 
114. See Editorial, Gonzales v. Gonzales, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A22 (noting strong 
evidence that Karl Rove, President Bush’s former top political advisor, and Harriet Miers, former 
White House counsel, were deeply involved in alleged purge of attorneys general). Compare Suzanne 
Malveaux, Bush Ready to Fight Lawmakers on U.S. Attorney Firings Flap, CNN.COM, Mar. 21, 2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/03/20/us.attorneys.firings/index.html (reporting on Bush White 
House’s opposition, based on executive privilege, to having any of its officials appear before 
congressional committees), with Stanley I. Kutler, Editorial, The ‘Executive Privilege’ Dodge, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 29, 2007, at A11 (expressing skepticism regarding applicability of executive privilege 
doctrine to proposed testimony of Rove and Miers). 
115. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed FED. R. EVID. 509(e), 46 F.R.D. 161, 273-74 (1969) (“If a 
claim of privilege for a secret of state is sustained . . . the judge shall make any further orders which the 
interests of justice require . . . .”). 
116. Id. at 274. 
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“Watergate scandal.”117 It is more striking that, in the aftermath of the White 
House’s failed attempt to cover up executive wrongdoing in Watergate, Congress 
took no action to restrict privileges asserted by the executive branch. Similarly, 
while the Bush White House is suspected of authorizing massive surveillance 
programs118 that may be inconsistent with the Constitution and with federal 
statutes, including the FISA,119 it is nonetheless pressing forward with legislation 
that would revise that Act so as to provide retroactive legislative approval for the 
alleged violations.120 Thus far, Congress has not sought to rein in the executive 
with competing legislation. Given this history of congressional inaction, there 
seems little hope for congressional regulation of the Privilege. 
B. Oversight Options 
If congressional legislation is unlikely to repair the Privilege, is 
congressional oversight a better option? Recent experience suggests that, 
especially in times of war—when the Privilege is most likely to be invoked—
Congress is unlikely to second-guess executive decisions relating to national 
security. Congress has generally been inexcusably timid and remiss,121 even in 
 
117. See 26 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 73, § 5661, at 444-67 (reviewing legislative history 
behind proposed Rule 509 with frequent references to progress of Watergate scandal).  
118. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1 (detailing secret National Security Agency surveillance program and 
noting that some officials questioned whether program crossed constitutional limits on legal searches). 
119. See In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 483 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 
(recounting allegations that Verizon Communications, Inc. disclosed telephone records to National 
Security Agency in violation of California residential customers’ privacy rights); Al-Haramain Islamic 
Found. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (D. Or. 2006) (detailing allegations that National Security 
Agency engaged in electronic surveillance of communications between plaintiff’s directors and third 
parties in violation of FISA); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2006) 
(recounting allegations that AT&T provided to National Security Agency records of telephone calls of 
its customers in violation of Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2000 & 
Supp. IV 2005)); ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (summarizing plaintiffs’ 
constitutional and statutory challenges to National Security Agency’s terrorist surveillance program), 
vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (recounting plaintiffs’ allegations that AT&T collaborated with National Security Agency in 
illegal and massive warrantless surveillance program). 
120. The revised definition of the liability defense states that:  
[N]o action shall lie or be maintained in any court, and no penalty, sanction, or other form of 
remedy or relief shall be imposed by any court or any other body, against any person for the 
alleged provision to an element of the intelligence community of any information (including 
records or other information pertaining to a customer), facilities, or any other form of 
assistance, during the period of time beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on the 
date that is the effective date of this Act, in connection with any alleged classified 
communications intelligence activity that the Attorney General or a designee of the 
Attorney General certifies, in a manner consistent with the protection of State secrets, is, 
was, would be, or would have been intended to protect the United States from a terrorist 
attack. This section shall apply to all actions, claims, or proceedings pending on or after the 
effective date of this Act. 
H.R. 3321, 110th Cong. § 5(a) (2007).  
121. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
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the area of war powers, where its constitutional powers could not be clearer.122 
Congress is thus unlikely to challenge executive authority on state secrets 
matters over which its constitutional authority is, if anything, more open to 
question. Congress appears to lack the institutional will to stand up to the 
President in the realm of foreign affairs.123 
Another problem with congressional oversight in this area is that, on the 
rare occasions when Congress does actually perform an oversight function in the 
foreign affairs realm, it tends to do so behind closed doors to prevent disclosure 
of sensitive information. Not only is the public not informed of the substance of 
such meetings, it is not even informed that such meetings take place—as in the 
case of the partial disclosure of the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) 
warrantless wiretap program to select members of Congress.124 Courts provide a 
better opportunity for holding the executive accountable to the public for its 
actions. Even if a court ultimately determines that the Privilege prevents it from 
reaching the merits of a particular case, courts generally provide written opinions 
explaining the reasoning underlying their decisions. Whatever reasoning 
underlies congressional decision making relating to state secrets will remain 
classified long after the purported secrets to which it relates have been disclosed 
or have become irrelevant. 
My final ground for opposing congressional (as opposed to judicial) checks 
on executive invocation of the Privilege is that the executive has expressed a 
preference for congressional checks,125 which leads me to believe that the 
 
931, 946-1004 (1999) (highlighting evidence of congressional abdication of its war and spending 
powers). 
122. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14 (empowering Congress to declare war, grant letters of 
marquee and reprisal, raise and support armies, provide and maintain navy, and make rules for 
government and regulation of armed forces); see also D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Foreign Affairs 
Power: Does the Constitution Matter? 80 TEMP. L. REV. 245, 252-59 (2007) (reviewing PETER IRONS, 
WAR POWERS: HOW THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY HIJACKED THE CONSTITUTION (2005); JOHN YOO, 
THE POWER OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005)) 
(detailing textual and historical arguments for congressional war powers); D.A. Jeremy Telman, A 
Truism that Isn’t True? The Tenth Amendment and Executive War Powers, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 135, 
149 (2001) (arguing that Congress is constitutionally empowered to control undeclared and declared 
war).  
123. See Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (2000) 
(decrying lack of effective check on presidential war powers due to combination of congressional 
acquiescence and judicial passivity).  
124. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 118 (noting that congressional leaders from both parties 
and other members of congressional intelligence committees were briefed on NSA surveillance 
program but did not disclose briefings and declined to be interviewed when New York Times 
investigated matter). Apparently, Senator Jay Rockefeller was troubled by the briefing he received 
and sent a handwritten letter of protest to Vice President Dick Cheney. Pat M. Holt, Congress is Partly 
to Blame for Bush’s Warrantless Wiretaps, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 5, 2006, at 9. 
125. “This is not to say there is no forum to air the weighty matters at issue, which remains a 
matter of considerable public interest and debate, but the resolution of these issues must be left to the 
political branches of government.” Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the United 
States’ Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the 
Alternative, for Summary Judgment; and Defendants’ Motion to Stay Consideration of Plaintiffs’ 
Motion of Summary Judgment, at 49, ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 2:06-
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executive branch is very confident of its ability to persuade Congress to support 
the executive on issues arguably relating to national security. In any case, as 
argued in Part IV.A, courts can protect state secrets while also protecting the 
rights and interests of litigants with interests adverse to the state by enforcing the 
Privilege but allowing the cases to proceed. 
Before proceeding to a discussion of how courts can address the Privilege 
on their own, we should take note of Amanda Frost’s novel approach, in which 
the judicial and legislative branches work in tandem as a check on executive 
power. Frost suggests that the invocation of the Privilege is like a form of 
jurisdiction stripping by the executive.126 As such, its invocation encroaches on 
congressional powers to confer jurisdiction on the courts.127 She suggests that the 
legislature and the courts could work together to check the executive and that in 
cases where the Privilege is successfully invoked and results in dismissal, courts 
should dismiss with the caveat that Congress must now undertake its own 
confidential investigation into executive conduct. Frost “tentatively” 
recommends caution that when the executive claims that issues of privilege must 
be left to the political branches of government: 
[C]ourts should not take its assertions at face value, but rather should 
determine whether Congress would be willing to assume the oversight 
function through investigation of executive action. Judges should 
assure themselves that the executive is, in fact, acceding to 
congressional demands for information about the challenged conduct, 
and is fully cooperating with the legislative committees seeking to 
monitor its conduct. Only if satisfied that Congress is holding the 
executive accountable should the judiciary be willing to forgo hearing 
whole categories of cases challenging executive authority.128  
Frost’s solution is a bold one, but it is difficult to imagine how a court could 
indeed satisfy itself of the adequacy of congressional action. Moreover, as argued 
above, there are reasons for skepticism regarding the likelihood that Congress 
could provide a robust check on executive invocation of the Privilege even if a 
court could satisfy itself of Congress’s desire to act. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO DISMISSAL 
Much of the law of the Privilege as set out in the United States v. Reynolds129 
opinion remains uncontroversial. In enforcing the Privilege, courts strive to 
strike a balance, neither permitting judicial control over evidence to be 
“abdicated to the caprice of executive officers”130 nor placing the President’s 
 
cv-10204).  
126. See Frost, supra note 18, at 1931-32 (acknowledging argument that invocation of Privilege to 
dismiss entire categories of cases involves “an unwarranted usurpation of judicial power”).  
127. See id. at 1932 (expressing concern that courts’ acquiescence in executive arguments urging 
dismissal of entire categories of cases intrudes on Congress’s jurisdiction-conferring authority). 
128. Id. at 1934. 
129. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
130. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10. 
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ability to preserve state secrets at the mercy of the courts.131 There is also 
general agreement on the procedural approach courts are to take when 
confronted with invocations of the Privilege.132 But courts must also determine 
how cases are to proceed in light of successful invocations of the Privilege.  
A. Creative Courts from Reynolds to Hepting 
As the Reynolds case made clear, courts must do their best to permit parties 
to assert their rights through legal process while also protecting state secrets.133 
While courts have generally been deferential to governmental assertions of the 
Privilege properly asserted,134 they have, in the past, been quite creative in 
fashioning means by which cases could proceed without the missing evidence. 
The D.C. Circuit, in the 1982 case Halkin v. Helms (Halkin II),135 adeptly stated 
this problem: 
The question then becomes whether the case is to proceed as if the 
privileged matter had simply never existed, with the parties bearing the 
consequent disadvantages (or advantages) of this sudden 
disappearance, or instead should proceed under rules that have been 
changed to accommodate the loss of the otherwise relevant evidence. 
Such changes could compensate the party “deprived” of his evidence 
by, for example, altering the burden of persuasion upon particular 
issues, or by supplying otherwise lost proofs through the device of 
presumptions or presumptive inferences.136 
Courts have not gone so far as the Halkin II court here suggests they might in 
terms of forcing the government to bear some of the costs of asserting the 
Privilege. Nevertheless, they have found other ways to permit litigation to 
proceed while also protecting state secrets. 
For example, in Halpern v. United States,137 the Second Circuit responded to 
the assertion of the Privilege by remanding the entire case for an in camera 
trial.138 Such a remedy may only be appropriate in cases in which keeping secrets 
 
131. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 304 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 06-1613, 2007 
WL 1646914 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2007). 
132. After laying out its understanding of the law on the Privilege, the Fourth Circuit noted that 
the plaintiff whose case it was about to dismiss “essentially accepts the legal framework described.” Id. 
at 308. 
133. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 (upholding Privilege while noting that necessity for divulgence 
of sensitive material was minimized by respondents’ failure to pursue alternative, namely interviewing 
surviving crew members); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1244 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(noting dismissal is proper “[o]nly when no amount of effort and care . . . will safeguard privileged 
material[s]”).  
134. According to statistics compiled by Bobby Chesney, courts granted thirty-three of the forty-
three motions to dismiss filed by the government in state secrets cases. Chesney, supra note 17, at 
1307. 
135. 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  
136. Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 991.  
137. 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958). 
138. Halpern, 258 F.2d at 43 (holding that district court should hold in camera proceeding if it 
could do so “without running any serious risk of divulgence of military secrets”).  
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from the plaintiffs or from witnesses is not a significant concern.139 But simply 
eliminating the jury and trying the case before a special master may suffice. In 
Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,140 the Second Circuit was persuaded 
that a jury trial was inappropriate because a “large amount of material properly 
classified confidential and secret must be submitted to the trier of fact in the 
case.”141 The Second Circuit therefore upheld the trial court’s decision to refer 
the case to a special master pursuant to Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.142 Similarly, in the recent case of Hepting v. AT&T Corp.,143 which 
relates to alleged NSA wiretapping and data-mining programs, the court 
contemplated the appointment of a special expert “pursuant to [Federal Rule of 
Evidence] 706 to assist the court in determining whether disclosing particular 
evidence would create a ‘reasonable danger’ of harming national security.”144  
In some cases, it may be possible to protect state secrets by adding an 
attorney to plaintiffs’ legal team who has security clearance or by granting 
security clearance to one of plaintiffs’ current counsel. For example, in cases 
relating to the Guantánamo detainees, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia required that plaintiff have access to counsel with the appropriate 
level of security clearance,145 and the court worked out a special framework 
designed to safeguard national security while also securing the individual right of 
access to counsel.146 A court may also issue a protective order, requiring that 
depositions be conducted in a secure facility and in the presence of government 
security officers who advise deponents as to what information may be 
revealed.147 
Another approach is for courts to place reasonable time restrictions on the 
 
139. The court was persuaded that trial in camera was feasible in Halpern because plaintiff and 
witnesses were all already familiar with the secret invention at the heart of the case. Id. 
140. 558 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1977). 
141. Loral Corp., 558 F.2d at 1132. 
142. Id. at 1132-33. 
143. 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
144. Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1010 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 706(a)).  
145. See Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2004) (requiring that counsel 
have “security clearance at the level appropriate for the level of knowledge the Government believes 
is possessed by the detainee”); In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 
2004) (requiring that petitioners’ counsel receive “necessary security clearance” to gain access to 
classified information relevant to cases); cf. Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 275-76 
(4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (suggesting that parties might identify alternative counsel who could receive 
necessary security clearance should present counsel be unable to obtain such clearance).  
146. See Al Odah, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14 (permitting unmonitored meetings between petitioner 
and counsel but requiring petitioner’s attorney to submit any information derived from such meetings 
to government classification review if counsel wished to disclose such information to anyone else); In 
re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 183-91 (setting forth procedures for counsel access 
to Guantánamo detainees, including requirements that such counsel have or obtain security 
clearance). 
147. See In re Under Seal, 945 F.2d 1285, 1287 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that trial court granted 
protective order filed by government that allowed depositions to be conducted in secure facilities and 
in presence of government security officers). 
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scope of the Privilege. In In re United States,148 the D.C. Circuit was unconvinced 
that the disclosure of twenty-year-old secrets relating to government surveillance 
of a Communist Party member created a reasonable danger to national 
security,149 and it expressed its confidence that the district court could 
“‘disentangle’ the sensitive from the nonsensitive information as the case 
unfolds.”150 It follows that, even if courts have to dismiss cases on state secrets 
grounds, they should do so without prejudice to the refiling of the case upon 
declassification of the relevant information.151 Courts should suspend any 
relevant statutes of limitations so as to may permit cases to be brought after the 
dangers attendant to disclosure lapse. 
Other courts have taken a more radical approach, which may indeed push 
beyond the boundaries of permissible judicial checks on executive powers, but 
which was not expressly foreclosed by Reynolds. In Black v. Sheraton Corp. of 
America,152 the District Court for the District of Columbia stated that any 
evidence concerning the government’s illegal acts, and evidence refuting 
allegations of government illegality, cannot be privileged.153 Such an approach 
would clearly prevent the transformation of the Privilege into a form of 
executive immunity. In Elson v. Bowen,154 the Supreme Court of Nevada found 
Reynolds to be “the key to the roomful of obscurity in this difficult area,” but 
stressed that case’s caution that “[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case 
cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.”155 In Elson, the trial 
court reviewed the claims of privilege and determined that government security 
was not endangered by disclosure.156 The Nevada Supreme Court nonetheless 
felt compelled to advise the parties as follows: “Government cannot break the 
law to enforce the law . . . and it follows that government should not be allowed 
to use the claims of executive privilege and departmental regulations as a shield 
of immunity for the unlawful conduct of its representatives.”157 In short, 
Reynolds left a lot of room for courts to be creative—and they were creative—in 
giving litigants their day in court while also preserving state secrets. Moreover, as 
Reynolds was a negligence suit, it provides little guidance on how the Privilege 
should operate in cases in which the government or its agents stand accused of 
 
148. 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
149. In re United States, 872 F.2d at 479 (finding itself, for myriad reasons, unable to determine 
based on its in camera review of government affidavit that disclosure of information relating to 
decades-old government activities would reveal state secrets).  
150. Id. (citing Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).  
151. A similar approach is that of the district court in Hepting, which refused to allow certain 
discovery, but invited plaintiffs to revisit the issue, as continuing disclosures regarding the challenged 
NSA surveillance program might make public the information with respect to which the government 
was asserting the Privilege. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 997-98 (N.D. Cal. 2006).  
152. 371 F.Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1974). 
153. Black, 371 F. Supp. at 101-02. 
154. 436 P.2d 12 (Nev. 1967). 
155. Elson, 436 P.2d at 16 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 9-10 (1952)). 
156. Id. at 16-17. 
157. Id. at 16 (citation omitted). 
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violating constitutional or statutory rights. 
B. Recent Trends 
Bobby Chesney has argued that the use of the Privilege has not really 
changed under the Bush administration, either in terms of the frequency with 
which the Privilege is invoked or in the ways in which it is being used.158 
Nevertheless, Chesney overlooks an important development that really is new—
invocations of the Privilege have long been coupled with motions to dismiss, but 
now the invocations of the Privilege and motions to dismiss come before 
discovery has begun, even in cases in which plaintiffs do not need discovery in 
order to establish their prima facie cases. The Privilege has thus morphed into a 
form of executive immunity. This change is explained by a confusion of two 
independent doctrines—the Privilege and the doctrine in Totten v. United 
States.159 The Totten doctrine states that cases may not proceed when the 
litigation itself constitutes an injury to the government through the threatened 
disclosure of state secrets.160  
In Totten, the administrator of the estate of a Civil War-era spy sued the 
government alleging breach of the terms of the espionage agreement.161 The 
Supreme Court, assuming that “[b]oth employer and agent must have 
understood that the lips of the other were to be for ever sealed respecting the 
relation of either to the matter,”162 held “that public policy forbids the 
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably 
lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential.”163 
Totten’s validity was confirmed and perhaps even expanded in the recent case of 
Tenet v. Doe,164 in which the Supreme Court ruled that not only claims for 
breach of contract but all claims relating to secret agreements between the 
government and third parties are barred under the Totten doctrine.165 
The difference between Totten and Reynolds once was clear. Totten shuts 
 
158. Chesney, supra note 17, at 1252 (contending that “recent assertions of the privilege are not 
different in kind from the practice of other administrations” in terms of types of information 
protected, process judges apply, or remedies sought). Chesney also contends that there is no strong 
evidence suggesting that the Bush administration has asserted the Privilege more frequently than past 
administrations, id. at 1301, or that it has sought dismissal more often than other administrations, id. at 
1306-07. Amanda Frost disagrees, noting that Chesney’s statistics suggest that the Bush administration 
has been more aggressive in its use of the Privilege. See Frost, supra note 18, at 1939 (“The Bush 
Administration has raised the privilege in twenty-eight percent more cases per year than in the 
previous decade, and has sought dismissal in ninety-two percent more cases per year than in the 
previous decade.”).  
159. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).  
160. Totten, 92 U.S. at 107. 
161. Id. at 105-06. 
162. Id. at 106. 
163. Id. at 107. 
164. 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
165. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 8 (noting that Totten forbids maintenance of any suit requiring disclosure 
of matters considered legally confidential).  
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down a case immediately;166 Reynolds simply recognizes an evidentiary privilege 
that affects discovery,167 but the impact of the Privilege could not possibly be 
discerned until discovery is completed. That is, while there may be cases where 
the successful invocation of the Privilege makes it impossible for plaintiff to 
establish her claims, a court usually cannot draw such a conclusion until it has 
determined at the close of discovery that plaintiff will not be able to establish her 
claims through the use of some evidence not subject to the Privilege. 
The Reynolds Court’s understanding of the Privilege was largely 
independent of Totten. The Reynolds Court invoked Totten in two contexts. 
First, it mentioned Totten as one of many cases demonstrating that “the privilege 
against revealing military secrets . . . is well established in the law of evidence.”168 
More significantly, although still in a footnote, the Court pointed to Totten as 
authority for the proposition that “even the most compelling necessity cannot 
overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military 
secrets are at stake.”169 The Supreme Court does not mention that a court can 
only be “ultimately satisfied” once discovery has taken place. There was no need 
to, as in Reynolds the Privilege was invoked only to bar plaintiffs’ request for the 
Air Force’s official accident investigation report.170 The Court never considered 
dismissing the claim in Reynolds. On the contrary, the Reynolds Court was 
persuaded that the Privilege should apply in that case because the government 
offered to make surviving crew members available for examination, rendering 
the accident investigation report unnecessary.171 Nonetheless, lower federal 
courts have ignored the procedural posture in Reynolds and read it to permit 
dismissal prior to discovery172 when in fact Reynolds provides no guidance in this 
area. 
Recent trends are alarming,173 as courts increasingly treat state secrets cases 
as though they were Totten cases and never even give plaintiffs the opportunity 
to make their case relying on public information not covered by the Privilege. 
This problem is well-illustrated in three types of cases in which the government 
has recently invoked the Privilege to win prediscovery dismissal of cases in which 
the allegations were largely based on public information or in which less 
 
166. See id. at 9 (noting that under Totten, case is “dismissed on the pleadings without ever 
reaching the question of evidence” (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953)).  
167. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1952).  
168. Id. (citing Totten, 92 U.S. at 107). 
169. Id. at 11 & n.26 (citing Totten, 92 U.S. 105).  
170. Id. at 3. 
171. Id. at 11. 
172. See, e.g., Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming prediscovery 
dismissal on state secrets grounds in religious discrimination case); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. 
Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (affirming prediscovery dismissal because 
disclosure of state secrets at trial would have been inevitable); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 
F. Supp. 2d 65, 81-82 (D.D.C. 2004) (ordering prediscovery dismissal of all of plaintiff’s constitutional 
and statutory claims upon finding that litigation posed “reasonable danger to secrets of state” (quoting 
In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989))).  
173. See Frost, supra note 18, at 1950-51 (criticizing government for invoking Privilege in seeking 
dismissal of categories of cases that raise constitutional challenges to government action). 
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draconian solutions were possible. Plaintiffs in the first type of case are former 
employees of federal agencies engaged in national security operations who allege 
wrongful termination. The second type involves recent cases of “extraordinary 
rendition,” and the final set of cases involves challenges to the NSA’s 
surveillance programs. The following discussion illustrates the problems that 
arise upon the invocation of the Privilege in the context of such cases through a 
discussion of some representative cases. 
In Edmonds v. U.S. Department of Justice,174 the plaintiff was a Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) translator who claimed to have uncovered 
evidence of willful misconduct and gross negligence that compromised the 
United States’ ability to carry out law enforcement and intelligence 
investigations relating to the attacks of September 11.175 Between December 
2001 and March 2002, Ms. Edmonds reported the alleged misconduct to the FBI 
and to the Acting Assistant Supervisory Agent in Charge.176 The FBI terminated 
Edmonds’s employment on March 22, 2002.177 Her suit against the Department 
of Justice alleged retaliatory termination in violation of constitutional and 
statutory protections for whistleblowers.178 Shortly after the District Court 
dismissed her case on state secret grounds, the FBI notified Senator Orrin Hatch 
that the Department of Justice’s Inspector General had completed an 
investigation into Ms. Edmonds’s case and concluded that her allegations of 
wrongdoing were “at least a contributing factor” in her termination.179 The U.S. 
Supreme Court nonetheless declined to hear the case. The district court 
apparently did not consider the possibility that the case might proceed in camera 
or with the aid of counsel with security clearance.180 
In El-Masri v. Tenet,181 plaintiff was a German national who alleged that he 
was detained while vacationing in Macedonia, held there for twenty-three days, 
and then transferred to a U.S. prison in Afghanistan where he was held for four 
months under conditions that violated human rights treaties to which the United 
States is a party.182 According to Mr. El-Masri, CIA officials quickly became 
aware that they had detained the wrong person, and he remained in detention 
for weeks after even both then CIA Director, George Tenet, and then National 
Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, were apprised of the fact that the United 
 
174. 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004).  
175. Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 67. 
176. Id. at 68-69. 
177. Id. at 69. 
178. Id. at 70. 
179. Letter from Robert S. Mueller III, Dir., FBI, to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm. 
on the Judiciary 1 (July 21, 2004), available at http://www.pogo.org/m/hsp/hsp-040721-Mueller.pdf. 
180. See Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 77-82 (concluding, after in camera, ex parte review of 
classified government declarations but no review of purportedly privileged documents and without any 
discussion of alternatives to dismissal, that successful invocation of Privilege necessitated dismissal). 
181. 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d sub nom. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 
(4th Cir. 2007). 
182. El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 532-35 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
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States was holding an innocent German citizen.183 The government, not a party 
to the El-Masri lawsuit, intervened and moved to dismiss the case on state 
secrets grounds.184 El-Masri’s attorneys argued that the Privilege was 
inapplicable or, in the alternative, did not necessitate dismissal, as the CIA’s 
extraordinary rendition program had been widely reported on and 
acknowledged by the government.185 In affirming the Eastern District of 
Virginia’s dismissal of the suit, the Fourth Circuit viewed its task as ascertaining 
“whether an action can be litigated without threatening the disclosure of such 
state secrets.”186 Mr. El-Masri was therefore incorrect to think that the “central 
facts” of his case were those alleged in the complaint.187 Rather, in order to 
decide the case, a court would have to determine that “the defendants were 
involved in his detention and interrogation in a manner that renders them 
personally liable to him.”188 Such information could not possibly be provided, 
the court concluded, without exposing “how the CIA organizes, staffs, and 
supervises its most sensitive intelligence operations.”189  
Before acknowledging the “heavy burden” imposed on El-Masri by its 
decision,190 the Fourth Circuit found it necessary to remind him of the court’s 
role: 
El-Masri envisions a judiciary that possesses a roving writ to ferret out 
and strike down executive excess. Article III, however, assigns the 
courts a more modest role: we simply decide cases and controversies. 
Thus, when an executive officer’s liability for official action can be 
established in a properly conducted judicial proceeding, we will not 
hesitate to enter judgment accordingly. But we would be guilty of 
excess in our own right if we were to disregard settled legal principles 
in order to reach the merits of an executive action that would not 
otherwise be before us—especially when the challenged action pertains 
to military or foreign policy. We decline to follow such a course, and 
thus reject El-Masri’s invitation to rule that the state secrets doctrine 
can be brushed aside on the ground that the President’s foreign policy 
has gotten out of line.191 
Two things are striking about this passage. First, El-Masri never asked the court 
to brush aside the state secrets doctrine. Rather, as the court acknowledged 
earlier in its opinion: 
El-Masri does not contend that the state secrets privilege has no role in 
these proceedings. To the contrary, he acknowledges that at least some 
 
183. Complaint at 12, El Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No. 1:05cv1417) 
available at http://www.aclu.org/images/extraordinaryrendition/asset_upload_file829_22211.pdf. 
184. El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 535. 
185. Id. at 537-38. 
186. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308.  
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 309. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 313. 
191. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 312-13. 
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information important to his claims is likely to be privileged, and thus 
beyond his reach. But he challenges the court’s determination that 
state secrets are so central to this matter that any attempt at further 
litigation would threaten their disclosure.192 
Second, the rhetoric of the court is that of judicial minimalism. The court will not 
set aside well-established law to invade the province of the executive. 
Nevertheless, there is no well-established law that requires the prediscovery 
dismissal of a suit that is not a Totten case. The El-Masri court is minimalist with 
respect to the prerogatives of the executive but activist when it comes to 
narrowing individual access to the courts. 
Finally, in a series of cases challenging both NSA wiretaps of international 
communications and NSA data mining of even domestic telecommunications 
based on a partnership with telephone service providers, the government has 
invoked the Privilege to prevent any judicial inquiry into the legality of this 
practice.193 In these cases, as in El-Masri, the government has asserted the 
Privilege and sought dismissal of actions, despite the fact that the government 
has acknowledged many of the allegations and others have been made public 
through press reports.194 Here the results have been mixed, with some courts 
allowing the cases to proceed195 while others permit the assertion of the Privilege 
and dismiss actions despite the government’s disclosures of at least some of the 
information necessary to plaintiffs’ claims.196 
Dismissal in these cases simply cannot be reconciled with Reynolds’s 
understanding of the Privilege as evidentiary in nature. Nor can it be reconciled 
with the understandings of the drafters of proposed Rule 509: “If privilege is 
successfully claimed by the government in litigation to which it is not a party, the 
effect is simply to make the evidence unavailable, as though a witness had died 
or claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, and no specification of the 
consequences is necessary.”197 By ignoring this fundamental understanding of 
 
192. Id. at 302. 
193. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NSA surveillance 
program.  
194. See, e.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1225 (D. Or. 2006) 
(noting that government had already “lifted the veil of secrecy on the existence of the Surveillance 
Program” and that plaintiffs sought only to establish lawfulness of government’s interception of their 
communications); ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 765 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (acknowledging that 
plaintiffs had established their prima facie case based solely on public statements regarding challenged 
“Terrorist Surveillance Program”), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). 
195. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (denying 
government motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, on state secrets grounds); 
ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 782 (granting plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and holding 
that NSA’s terrorist surveillance program violates Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.)). 
196. See, e.g., Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (granting 
government’s motion to dismiss action on state secrets grounds). 
197. See Advisory Committee’s Note to Preliminary Draft of Proposed FED. R. EVID. 509(e), 56 
F.R.D. 183, 254 (1973); accord Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting effect of 
government’s invocation of state secrets privilege is well settled and results only in unavailability of 
evidence without affecting case’s proceeding). It should be noted that the final version of the proposed 
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the Privilege, shared by the Reynolds Court and the drafters of proposed Rule 
509, courts have transformed the Privilege into a new form of executive 
immunity. 
CONCLUSION 
It is time for courts to return to United States v. Reynolds198 and to 
reconsider what it means for the Privilege to be conceived by analogy to the 
privilege against self-incrimination. The judiciary, rather than Congress, is the 
branch of government best positioned to do so, because courts are best situated 
to realize, on a case-by-case basis, the delicate balance that protects state secrets 
while preserving individual rights. Congress lacks both the institutional 
competence to properly handle an evidentiary privilege and the will to confront 
possible executive abuses of the Privilege. 
In short, Reynolds must be disentangled from Totten v. United States,199 
especially in cases involving alleged violations of statutory and constitutional 
rights. Much of the work of disentanglement can be comfortably achieved at the 
lower court level within the boundaries of Reynolds. To some extent, however, it 
may be necessary for the Supreme Court to revisit its decision in Reynolds and to 
provide direction to lower courts in cases that raise questions that were not 
before the Reynolds court. Specifically, Reynolds does not clearly govern cases in 
which the government or its agents stand accused of constitutional or statutory 
violations. It makes no sense to permit the government to invoke a privilege in 
connection with conduct in which neither it nor its agents may lawfully engage. If 
the government or its agents are charged with illegal conduct, it cannot claim—as 
it now routinely does—that the public has no right to demand a straight answer 
to the question: did you do it? 
 
rule was not entirely in accord with the ideas of its original drafters. See supra notes 106-13 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of intent of original drafters compared to the final version of the 
proposed rule.  
198. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).  
199. 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
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